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Section II : Identity
“Am I My Brother’s Keeper?”─Discriminatory 
Practices in the Name of Security
Miguelángel VERDE（1）（Kyoto University）
Seven years after the Japanese government abolished ﬁ ngerprinting 
of foreign nationals due to an unusual display of discontent in civil 
society, it has decided to amend its immigration laws ( 改 正 入 管
法 ) to allow, once more, for fingerprinting and photographing of 
foreign nationals, no matter their visa or residence status. In blatant 
contradiction with Japanese law, which makes it illegal to ﬁ ngerprint 
anyone that has not been charged with a crime, this controversial 
measure is weakly justified by stating it will help to “prevent the 
occurrence of acts of terrorism against Japan.” However, with the 
exception of the Japanese Embassy hostage crisis in Lima, Peru, Japan 
has never suﬀ ered a terrorist act that didn’t involve Japanese nationals 
solely. The arrests that followed the Aum Shinrikyou’s (オウム真理経 ) 
ﬁ endish Tokyo sarin gas incident lead approximately twenty Japanese 
nationals to be tried and convicted by the justice system, but none of 
the cult’s internationals members were ever found to be involved in 
the attacks. Similarly, the infamous Japanese Red Army ( 日 本 赤 軍
), which hijacked airplanes, bombed and stormed company facilities 
and embassies, and murdered civilian bystanders indiscriminately, 
perpetrated thirteen terrorist acts between the 1970s and the 1980s. 
And yet, only two on them were committed on Japanese soil, while the 
other eleven were committed abroad; in every case, nonetheless, the 
participants involved in the attacks were solely Japanese nationals.
資料および配布資料
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The Japanese word for a stranger ( 他 人 ) is an “other person.” 
Foreigners ( 外 国 人 , “outside country people”), likewise, are usually 
called gaijin ( 外 人 ), “outside people” or “outsider,” in informal 
circumstances. The Japanese scholar Ohsawa Masachi has forwarded 
that the Aum sect “can be seen as an extreme reflection of Japanese 
society in general,” since it “mirrors the same type of fear toward 
the ambivalent ‘other’ common within the Japanese population.” For 
Ohsawa, that fear of the ambivalent ‘other’ is “a symptom of the social 
disintegration brought forth by advanced capitalism,” and in that 
manner “not particular to the Japanese, but rather reflected in many 
ethnic nationalisms and religious fundamentalisms of contemporary 
global society.” Nowadays, when globalization leads us inevitably to 
attempt to constructively deal with the intricacies of multicultural 
contexts, the return of undeniable racisms and state-sponsored 
discriminatory policies must be carefully analyzed and protested.
Within this article, we will briefly review Carl Gustav Jung’s 
psychoanalytic shadow archetype, which attributes to others “all the evil 
and inferior qualities that we do not like to recognize in ourselves.” In 
order to better understand how the notion of the ‘Other’ is framed in 
terms that allow to detach ourselves from what we revile in ourselves, 
and project these dissatisfactions and uncertainties unto those that are 
beyond the limits of our communities, we will focus on the collective 
shadow. Likewise, an examination of Frankfurt School thinkers 
Theodor W. Adorno’s and Max Horkheimer’s concept of mimesis 
may allow us to understand the nature of the ambivalent horror/
desire relation that every culture experiences towards other ‘alien’ 
cultures, and how the same emotional core that contains the seeds of 
hate also contains a potential for reconciliation. We intend, in this 
manner, to pose Japan’s amended immigration policy as a case study 
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that can forward explanations on how nations that defend universal 
human rights and humanitarian aid can also advocate nationalism 
and discrimination; the threat that the latter represent to attempts at 
multiculturalism and social justice; and, the possibilities we have in 
order to overcome such a dilemma, if we have the suﬃ  cient bravery to 
attempt the moral eﬀ ort required to recognize “the dark aspects of [our 
collective] personality as present and real."
“ G o v e r nm e n t s  p e r c e i v e d 
September 11th as an opportunity 
to push forward programs, often 
harsh and regressive programs, that 
they knew the population would 
either oppose or certainly not be very 
satisfied with, but that they could 
push ‒ carry through ‒ under the 
… using the moment of fear and 
tension and also with the appeal to a 
kind of … a false kind of patriotism 
which translates into loyalty and 
subordination. I mean that is the kind 
of things power systems tend to do. 
If they have an opportunity they are 
going to use it.”
Noam Chomsky in an interview 
wi th  John  Junkerman for  the 
documentary Terror and power: 
Noam Chomsky in our times
131
 “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?”
On May 2006 the Immigration Control And Refugee Recognition Act 
was revised: foreigners entering Japan would be required to have their 
ﬁ ngerprints and photographs taken, as well as other personal identiﬁ cation 
information, to later cross-reference the collected biometric data with lists 
of convicted criminals, potential terrorists and past deportees. Since then, 
the Japanese state has repeatedly expressed its concern that its support 
to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, embodied by the deployment 
of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to these countries, could prompt terrorist 
attacks within the nation. Japanese Minister of Justice Hatoyama Kunio, in 
late 2007, ludicrously attempted to justify the revision when he stated that 
“an acquaintance of a friend” was an Al-Qaeda operative who had entered 
Japan a number of times with fake passports. The media was also quick 
to note that Japan would be the second nation to compile biometric data of 
its foreign visitors, since the United States had started to do so already by 
2004.
The truth is that Japan is not the second nation to do so, but 
the United States, because Japan had already required compulsory 
ﬁ ngerprinting in the past. Likewise, the Japanese government has decided 
not to compile the biometric data only of its foreign visitors, but of the 
entirety of its foreign population, since foreign residents, even those that 
have been granted permanent residence, are also required to provide 
ﬁ ngerprints and photographs every time they decide upon re-entry. The 
only exceptions are children under the age of 16, and the country’s ethnic 
Chinese and Korean permanent residents, who continue to be denied 
Japanese citizenship upon birth, despite the fact that the majority come 
from the ﬁ rst and second generations that were born and raised in Japan, 
their forefathers mostly immigrants (or, forced laborers) that came to 
reside in the fascist colonial Empire of Japan in the years before, and of, 
the Second World War.
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From 1955 onwards, the Japanese Alien Registration Law burdened 
foreigners with the requirement to always have their Alien Registration 
Certificates on their persons, a ten-page identification that featured the 
person’s fingerprints and personal information. In 1987 revisions ended 
the requirement that demanded that a new set of ﬁ ngerprints be taken 
every five years. In 1992 compulsory fingerprinting was abolished for 
permanent foreign residents, but they were still required to have their 
Alien Registration Certificates at all times or be subject to criminal 
penalties; other foreign residents, however, were still required to provide 
their fingerprints. Slowly, a trickle of foreign residents that refused to 
submit their ﬁ ngerprints (the ﬁ rst, Tokyoite Han Jong Sok in 1980) became 
a massive stream of more than 11000 people that were actively involved 
civil disobedience. The refusal, for some, meant imprisonment; for others, 
heavy ﬁ nes. When the international media’s attention turned to these facts, 
the Japanese government relented in its continued attempts to ﬁ ngerprint 
its foreign residents, confronted as it was with its most important cases 
of civil disobedience since the student protest of the 1960s. The year 
1999 saw a further revision of the Alien Registration Law that replaced 
fingerprints with a signature, and lessened the punishment for not 
carrying the new oﬃ  cial identiﬁ cation, the Alien Registration Card, from a 
criminal penalty to an administrative one.
The most recent revisions return foreign residents to a status prior 
that existent in the 1980s. Upon entry to Japan, or re-entry in the case of 
residents, fingerprinting can also be denied: the penalty, now, is simply 
the impossibility to either enter, or even re-enter, the country. Beyond the 
much-needed discussion on whether such policies in themselves violate 
basic human rights, other consequences remain to be explored. Due to the 
fact that ﬁ ngerprinting is reserved only for people arrested for crimes in 
Japan, and that the compiled data (to be kept not only for the duration 
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of the person’s stay in Japan, but for 70 years after its compilation) can 
be shared with the police and other state authorities upon request, it 
is clear that the motive for this policy is mainly intended to facilitate 
surveillance and control over anyone that is not considered to be part of 
Japanese society. To clarify why I use the words surveillance and control, 
I refer to the fact that the year after ﬁ ngerprinting was abolished, Japan’
s National Police Agency started to release statistics on crimes committed 
by foreigners every six months. To be sure, these statistics were not 
accompanied by statistics on crime committed by Japanese citizens, in 
order to allow some contextualization, let alone statistical interpretation. 
Laxity in measures that previously allowed a dramatic diﬀ erence in the 
availability of personal data to the authorities between Japanese and 
foreign citizens was immediately met with measures that attempted to 
rouse worry and concern in the ethnic Japanese citizenry about its foreign 
minorities.
The Japanese media, in particular newspaper publications, also 
contributed to a slanted view on crime within Japan. Arudou Debito, 
prominent naturalized social activist, in collaboration with The Japan 
Times, explains that The Asahi Shinbun, for example, had very few 
articles on murder in 1985; however, in 2005, despite the fact that murder 
rates were lower, articles on murder exceeded a thousand. On February 
8th 2007, The Mainichi Shinbun featured an English headline that read 
as follows: "Number of crimes committed by nonpermanent foreigners 
declines in Tokyo;" however, the same article's headline read in Japanese: 
“Foreign crime rises in the provinces: Chubu Region up 35-fold in 15 
years.” （2） Is it no surprise that with such a bias towards the perceived 
role of minorities in what concerns crime the Japanese Immigration 
Bureau announced, in October 2007, that their telephone hotline now also 
allows for calls on weekends and holidays to report illegal immigrants to 
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the authorities. The Bureau’s stated intention is to reduce the number 
of “illegal stay foreigner [sic]” (to half the number existent in 2004 by the 
end of 2008) in order to “revive the title […] ‘the safest country in the 
world,’” （3） and thereby ensure a reduction in crime within the nation. 
Japanese citizens are thus called upon to collaborate with the authorities 
in order to better achieve such an end. Illegal immigration, inasmuch as 
it is a crime in itself, can be considered a major factor that contributes to 
increased crime within any country. Since people that cannot legally work 
must resort to informal activities, legal activities procured either by fake 
paperwork and/or employers that close their eyes to the law, or to illegal 
activities. And yet, when the Japanese government decided to return to its 
compulsory ﬁ ngerprinting policy of foreigners, it contended that this was 
necessary to ensure protection from potential terrorist threats. Obviously, 
what this rationale allows is to subsume a discriminatory practice within 
the wider scope of the international’s community’s most recent eﬀ orts at 
security.
More than a critique of poorly construed state policies, however, 
what this article wishes to explore are the psychological and socio-
cultural mechanisms that allow discriminatory practices to be matter-of-
factly accepted by the majority population as a necessity, and additionally, 
accepted, believed and upheld to be a practice that is not discriminatory 
in nature. Before we continue, nonetheless, it is important to explain why 
we believe that the policy revision’s intention is not mostly to “prevent the 
occurrence of acts of terrorism against Japan,” and why, even if it were, 
this blatant contradiction with Japanese law, which makes it illegal to 
ﬁ ngerprint anyone that has not been indicted with a crime, fails to truly 
increase security with Japan in what concerns the threat of terrorism. 
Truth be told, with the exception of the Japanese embassy hostage 
crisis in Lima, Peru, which lasted December 1996 through April 1997, 
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Japan has never suﬀ ered a terrorist act that didn’t solely involve Japanese 
nationals. The hostage crisis, which occurred when forces of the Túpac 
Amaru Revolutionary Movement stormed the official residence in the 
midst of a party that was held in celebration of Emperor Akihito’s 
birthday, can be considered a terrorist act that victimized Japan only due 
to the diplomatic convention that a embassy is considered to stand upon 
its own nation’s soil. However, if we are to analyze acts of terrorism that 
have occurred within Japan proper, we must refer exclusively to either 
that perpetrated by Aum Shinrikyou ( オウム真理経 ) in their 1995 sarin 
gas attack on the Tokyo subway system ( 地下鉄サリン事件 ) or to those 
perpetrated by the Japanese Red Army ( 日本赤軍 ) in 1970 and 1974（4）. 
The irony that arises from this revision, as we have stated above, is the 
fact that the arrests that followed the Aum Shinrikyou sect’s fiendish 
attack to Tokyo lead some twenty Japanese nationals to be tried and 
convicted by the justice system, but none of the cult’s internationals 
members were ever found to be involved in the attacks. Similarly, in 
every terrorist act committed by the infamous Japanese Red Army the 
participants involved in the attacks were solely Japanese nationals. The 
most likely participants, therefore, in any terrorist threat toward Japan 
would either be ethnic Japanese terrorist cells ‒ such as Aum Shinrikyou 
‒ or ethnic Japanese terrorist cells with sympathies for other international 
terrorist fronts ‒ such was the case of the Japanese Red Army, which had 
close ties to the Popular Front For The Liberation of Palestine. And yet, 
Japanese ethnic citizens remain to be scrutinized by security authorities 
with the same zeal as ethnically foreign citizens.
Nowadays, when globalization leads us inevitably to attempt to 
constructively deal with the intricacies of multicultural contexts, the 
return of undeniable racisms and state-sponsored discriminatory policies 
must be carefully analyzed and protested. The socio-cultural studies of 
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Japanese scholar Ohsawa Masachi forward that the Aum Shinrikyou sect 
“can be seen as an extreme reﬂ ection of Japanese society in general,” since 
it “mirrors the same type of fear toward the ambivalent ‘other’ common 
within the Japanese population.” （5） The usual Japanese word for stranger 
is 他人 (literally, “other person”). While foreigners are usually called 外国
人 (lit. “outside country person”), in circumstances when a certain snide 
undertone wishes to be added they are called 外人 (lit. “outside person” 
or “outsider”). The fear of the ambivalent “other” is “a symptom of the 
social disintegration brought forth by advanced capitalism,” and in that 
manner it is “not particular to the Japanese, but rather reﬂ ected in many 
ethnic nationalisms and religious fundamentalisms of contemporary global 
society.” （6） As Ohsawa points out, what needs to be addressed is the 
very mechanism that causes people to posit these “others” as plausible 
and real（7）. Ohsawa explains that our conception of reality is mostly 
determined “by its relation to that which is not real or anti-reality […] in 
other words, we construct our meaningful reality by (unconsciously) posing 
it against that which we have accepted as not real.” （8） To understand the 
socio-cultural implications that that political discrimination entails, we will 
ﬁ rst provide a psychological exploration of why the phenomenon occurs. 
This is what leads us to examine the role that the shadow archetype plays 
in the psychoanalytic theory proposed by the Swiss psychologist Carl 
Gustav Jung. 
From the standpoint of the psychology of the personality, Jung 
clarifies, a twofold division ensures: “an ‘extra-conscious’ psyche whose 
contents are personal, and an ‘extra-conscious’ psyche whose contents are 
impersonal and collective […] the second group forms are, as it were, an 
omnipresent, unchanging and everywhere identical quality or substrate 
of the psyche per se.” （9） These are what have come to be understood as 
the psyche’s archetypes. The shadow is a fundamental archetype in the 
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development of the individual’s and the collective’s psyche. To become 
conscious of the shadow archetype, explains Jung, is to recognize “the dark 
aspects of the personality as present and real.” （10） An examination of these 
dark characteristics ‒ that is, the inferiorities that constitute the shadow 
‒ reveals an emotional nature, a kind of autonomy and an obsessive or, 
better, possessive quality. A weakness, a certain inferiority and lower level 
of personality is contained within the shadow（11）. That is why the pursuit 
of self-knowledge is a moral problem that always is met with considerable 
emotional resistance（12）, and why it is bound up with projections that 
are not recognized as such, since their recognition represents a moral 
achievement beyond the ordinary（13）. Surely, “some traits peculiar to 
the shadow can be recognized without much diﬃ  culty as one’s own,” but 
the cause of emotional resistance “appears to lie, beyond all possibility of 
doubt, in the other person.” （14） Since it is not the conscious subject but the 
unconscious which projects ‒ “one meets with projections, one does not 
make them,” ‒ no matter how obvious it may be to a neutral observer 
that the resistance is a matter of projections, there is little hope that the 
subject will perceive this, and will be able to withdraw his emotionally-
toned projections from their object（15）.
The peril that results from projection is that the subject is isolated 
from its environment, since instead of a real relation there is now only an 
illusory one. Jung describes that “projections change the world into the 
replica of one’s own unknown face（16）.” Similarly, Ohsawa has observed 
that Aum Shinrikyou was characterized by an intense delusional paranoia. 
However, both the sect and the mainstream Japanese population fulﬁ lled 
conspiracy fantasies for each other: 
Conspiracy fantasies project the cause of unacceptable disorder 
onto imaginary and thus unknown “others.” Aum members and 
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Japan’s general population seem to fulﬁ ll this imaginary role for one 
another. They project[ed] their own fantasy onto each other, mistaking 
their own mirror-image for the enemy. It is precisely the reciprocal 
projection of the structure of this fantasy, rather than the content of 
various fantasies, that renders the fantasies real（17）.
Likewise, Aum Shinrikyou feared spies in their midst:
Because it is diﬃ  cult to ascertain who is a spy, everyone comes 
under suspicion […] The neurotic fear of espionage points to the 
ambivalent and contradictory character of the mysterious other. On 
the one hand, such disturbing others are, by deﬁ nition, unknown and 
as far removed from Aum as possible. On the other hand, the same 
fear of espionage produces the anxiety that those distant others might 
indeed be very close. In the extreme case of the latter scenario, the 
other becomes internal to the social structure and is now amongst 
“us” […] The fear of such an ambivalent and unstable relation of the 
other fueled their fantasy of conspiracies and drove them to wage war 
against civil society（18）.
We understood from Ohsawa’s conclusions on the dynamics which 
rooted Aum Shinrikyou’s twisted perception of reality, and from what is 
implied by the fact that the sect represents an extreme instance of what 
Japanese culture and society experiences towards what it consider an 
“other,” that more than likely, the discriminatory policies articulated by 
the Japanese government must resound with some ambivalent sentiments 
shared, mostly unconsciously, by the majority population of ethnic 
Japanese. Jung explains that due to the escapist dream of a world whose 
reality remains unattainable, the resultant sentiment d'incomplétude and 
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sensation of sterility are explained by projection as the malevolence of 
the environment, and in turn intensiﬁ es the vicious circle of isolation（19）. 
He calls out attention to the peril that the inability to recognize one’s own 
shadow implies:
It is often tragic to see how blatantly a man bungles his own 
life and the life of others yet remains totally incapable of seeing how 
much the whole tragedy originates in himself, and how he continually 
feeds it and keeps it going. Not consciously, of course […] it is an 
unconscious factor which spins the illusions that veil his world. And 
what is being spun is a cocoon, which in the end will completely 
envelop him（20）.
Jung warns us that when we simply declare facts unreal (or, as 
Ohsawa has explained, when we “accept” them as not real) we do not 
really dispose of them. A projection has an undeniable reality, and to 
deny it is to become identical to it, “which is not only dubious in itself but 
a positive danger to the well-being of the individual.” （21） When certain 
contents of the unconscious are not interpreted and incorporated into 
the conscious, they intensify to pathological proportions: they lead to 
“apparently groundless phobias and obsessions ‒ crazes, idiosyncrasies, 
hypochondriac ideas, and intellectual perversions suitably camouﬂ aged in 
social, religious, or political garb.”（22） We can contend, quite easily, that 
racism (which in the more recent centuries have founded their irrationality 
in “rational” pseudo-scientific, -philosophical and -cultural explanations 
with monstrous consequences, as proven by the Holocaust and other 
contemporary genocides, i.e. in Eastern Europe and in Africa) echoes with 
these socially and politically veiled intellectual perversions. When society 
is unable to face its collective shadow, it projects its dissatisfactions and 
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uncertainties upon the others that live beyond its established limits; it 
projects the characteristics that it reviles the most from within its own 
community, and condemn others to live under that own shadow, and to 
embody it for its sake.
Ohsawa explains that while the other, on the one hand, “can be a 
source of great enjoyment […] The same other, on the other hand, can 
become the intolerable enemy.” (p.15). Japan’s fascination (and obsession) 
with itself, evidenced in the “scholarly” pursuit of theories of “Japanese-
ness” ( 日 本 人 論 , nihonjinron), also coincides with its fascination (and 
obsession) with the materialistic pursuit of “otherness,” evidenced in a 
consumer culture and industry that attempts to emulate, and adopt as its 
own, the lifestyle and commodities that abound in the United States and 
western European countries. Undoubtedly, since the very ﬁ rst unexpected 
clashes with Commodore Perry’s “black ships” which abruptly ended the 
national isolation and exclusion of foreigners policy ( 鎖国 ) of Edo period, 
and later on with the socio-cultural discontinuity that resulted from the 
Allied Forces’ occupation after the end of World War II (predominantly, 
the United States’), Japan has felt, as a nation, a need to re-interpret its 
history and identity. However, any conscious attempt to make sense of 
what its defeat meant from a social and cultural standpoint (and, with 
concern to the latter case, even to make sense of why it was involved 
in a brutal military attempt to colonize the rest of Asia) is usually met 
with intense resistance, and on the contrary, substituted by attempts 
to explain its extraordinary economic and political recovery (also, in the 
latter case) not in terms that explore the United States’ direct supervision 
of and involvement in Japanese society’s concerted eﬀ ort to overcome its 
hardships, but in terms that hypostatize carefully selected socio-cultural 
values as the principal reasons ‒ if not the only reasons.
Xenophobic projections fortify the shared (or politically force-fed) 
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delusion that in every instance Japanese society is orderly and secure 
and desired, that there are no reasons to expect either the hardships or 
discontent that foster criminal or anomic behavior from other members 
of Japanese society, and that without minorities (or with only a very well-
selected minority) a quasi-idyllic state of affairs is most likely to upheld 
effortlessly. Social anthropologist Bruce Caron advances that persistent 
nihonjinron statements and theses to contemporary Japan should cause 
as much concern as persistent racist, homophobic and gender-biased 
statements and theses in the West（23）. The above-mentioned concern 
should also include “Western scholars who continue to reify Japanese 
uniqueness in a variety of arenas,” because “that a shared history of 
isolation would create not only cultural differences, but biological ones 
as well is a central feature of nihonjinron.” （24） Caron explains that this 
decided-upon “common and unique history” is also employ to stress the 
diﬀ erences that allow for outlandish claims, for example, that the isolation 
imposed on the burakumin（25） has lead them to “now have a divergent 
biology.”（26） It would seem that to be born and raised in Japan by Japanese 
parents is insufficient in order to be considered Japanese unless a “full 
genetic heritage of the ‘we Japanese’ is shared.”（27） This particular case 
is an undeniable example in which the racist undertones that commonly 
underlie discriminatory practices in Japan are evident（28）. The case is, 
however, not so diﬀ erent from that which the several generations of born 
and raised in Japan Korean and Chinese minorities experience ‒ except for 
the fact that in these cases the “divergent biology” is a given.
We will conclude our eﬀ ort to provide what may be suﬃ  cient analysis 
on how Japan continues to enforce its discriminatory practices, what 
dynamics lead to discrimination are, and some reasons why discriminatory 
practices occur in Japan, with an attempt to interpret how such practices 
may be overcome by what the Frankfurt School philosophers Theodor 
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W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer understood by mimesis. The German 
philosopher Jurgen Habermas explains that mimesis recalls the “relation 
between person in which the one accommodates the other, identifies 
with the other, empathizes with the other.” It is the surrender of the 
one to the example of the other not as a loss of self but as enrichment, 
which counters the domination that derives from the instrumentality that 
reason endeavors to secure for the subject over the object（29）. Adorno 
and Horkheimer, in relation to the consequences of instrumental reason, 
explain that individuals’ increase in power and domination leads to 
“alienation from that over which they exercise their power,” （30） be it the 
world or other individuals. The zeal for self-preservation which lies within 
modern reason has an unsuspected cost: that which is to be preserved 
(that is to say, life) is that “which is dominated, suppressed, and dissolved 
[…] Totalitarian capitalism […] makes the satisfaction of needs impossible 
and tends toward the extermination of mankind.” （31）
Thus, explain Horkheimer and Adorno, rationality supplants 
mimesis in the contemporary world. Reason is not only its counterpart: 
it establishes a “mimesis unto death,” （32） a twisted mimesis that enters 
the service of domination inasmuch as it dries interactions into dead and 
empty abstract husks that lead to systemic optimization, but severely 
hinders both the vital experiences and the intimate emotions that occur 
when individuals enter in contact with an other. The Frankfurt School 
philosophers, whom dedicated the last sections of their text to the study 
of anti-Semitism, explain that violent racism is “probably the morbid 
expression of a repressed mimesis,” （33） for if mimesis wants to become 
familiar with that which is alien, the projections proper to hatred confuse 
the inner and outer worlds, and attribute to the object “impulses which 
the subject will not admit as his own.” （34） Thus, the prospect of intimacy ‒ 
and perhaps, reconciliation ‒ is condemned to mere hostility. In fascism, “this 
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behavior is made political.” （35） They further explain that “the transference 
of socially taboo impulses from the subject to the object,” （36） what 
psychoanalysis terms a morbid projection, explains why “the fantasies 
of Jewish crimes […] accurately deﬁ ne the anti-Semitic dream.” （37） While 
discrimination in Japan has not turned violent yet, history teaches us that 
Imperial Japan was not above the most brutal displays of hatred.
We can collect, from Horkheimer and Adorno’s theory on mimesis, 
that the outline we have drawn on some Japanese political issues, 
Ohsawa’s (and Caron’s) reﬂ ections on Japanese society and its relation to 
the other, and Jung’s psychoanalysis of the consequences of the shadow 
archetype’s projections upon both on the psyche and the collective psyche, 
do not stray from a reasonable portrayal of what the facts may be. We 
will now attempt to describe in which way social behaviors directed by 
the notion of mimesis can lead to the resemantization of a socialization 
that is at times obscured by discriminatory practices. When Adorno 
continued to develop the notion of mimesis, he rested the foundations of 
his aesthetic theory on it. Mimesis and rationality are irreconcilable（38）, as 
art and rationality are, because while rationality attempts to dominate its 
object, mimesis, as does art, attempts to assimilate itself to it（39）. Mimetic 
behavior is:
A receptacle for everything that has been violently lopped off 
from and repressed in man by centuries of civilization […] keeps alive 
the memory of a kind of objectivity which lies beyond conceptual 
frameworks [and] sees more in things than they are […] It is aesthetic 
behaviour alone which is able to experience the world（40）.
Adorno contended that the “contemporary loss of any subjective 
capacity to experience the world objectively is most likely identical with 
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the tenacious suppression of mimesis today.” （41） That is why Horkheimer 
and Adorno ﬁ nd in the Homer’s poem about the confrontation of Odysseus 
with the sirens a myth that breathes life into what they attempt to say 
about mimesis. Odysseus, they explain, “however consciously alienated 
from nature as he may be […] remains subject to it if he heeds its 
voice.” （42） Both awed and dismayed by the siren’s chant, while Odysseus 
uses ratio to lead his men safely passed the sirens, he also uses it to be 
enable himself to experience the siren’s ecstatic melody. Adorno explains 
that inasmuch as aesthetic behavior can “be deﬁ ned as the ability to be 
horrified,” the shudder that comes from an experience of horror before 
the object, it is also “a kind of premonition of subjectivity, a sense of being 
touched by the other […] Without shudder, consciousness is trapped in 
reiﬁ cation.” （43） If we do not allow ourselves the confusion that comes from 
interaction with others, we do not allow ourselves the further experience 
of harmony either. The mimetic attempt to assimilate ourselves to others, 
instead of subdue them, constitutes a “orientation of the subject towards 
objectivity which joins eros to knowledge,” （44） and an “endeavor to recover 
the bliss of a world that is gone.” （45）
Adorno concludes:
Far beyond the Romanticism which felt itself as weltschmerz, 
as the suﬀ ering from alienation, hover Eichendorﬀ 's words, ‘beautiful 
stranger [Fremde: alien, stranger]’. The reconciled condition would 
not annex the alien [Fremde] by means of a philosophical imperialism, 
but would ﬁ nd its happiness in the fact that the latter remains what 
is distant and divergent in the given nearness, as far beyond the 
heterogeneous as what is its own（46）.
Habermas describes Adorno’s concept of reconciliation as an intact 
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intersubjectivity that is only established and maintained in the reciprocity 
of mutual understanding based on free recognition（47）. A multicultural 
society should strive to advance socialization upon these lines: by the 
promotion of social equity, by political institutions that respect and value 
the totality of society’s members, and by policies that are not founded 
on biases, but inclusive and pluralistic from a socio-political standpoint. 
What mimesis may allow us to understand is the nature of the ambivalent 
horror/desire relation that every culture experiences towards other “alien” 
cultures, and how the same emotional core that contains the seeds of 
hatred also contains a potential for reconciliation.
I am indebted to a friend who recently reminded me that only a 
culture that is dead can be kept intact in a world is alive. Cultures exist 
and cease to exist, and that constitutes no dilemma inasmuch as the 
people that embrace them learn to live fully, with or without them, and to 
allow for new cultures to be born. A people that wish to prosper can only 
do so if they walk into the future, burdened only by the lessons that their 
memory provides them, but not if they walk back into the past. From the 
postwar ashes and rubble, the Japanese people pave a solid road into the 
future, a future where their state must learn to embrace a new culture, 
which accepts others into the Japanese people, and embraces them within 
that “us.” In this new culture, we shall truly all be our brothers’ keepers.
Notes
（1） Miguelángel Verde is a Master’s student in Contemporary Civilization Studies at 
the Graduate School of Human and Environmental Studies at Kyouto University, 
Japan. He specializes in the study of political philosophy, especially ultranationalism, 
democracy and totalitarianism.
 For any inquiries, email: verde.m@gmail.com.
（2） Arudou, 2007: sole p.
（3） Japanese Immigration Bureau, 2007: sole p.
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（4） Even so, the Japanese Red Army’s activities continued until 1988, for a total of 
thirteen terrorist acts, which included: hijacked airplanes, bombed and stormed 
company facilities and embassies, and the indiscriminate murder of civilian 
bystanders. The other eleven cases (excluded the 1970 and 1974 acts committed in 
Japan) occurred abroad, and victimized also other countries’ embassies, companies, 
airplanes and civilians. 
（5） Ohsawa, 2003: 1.
（6） Ohsawa, 2003: 1.
（7） Ohsawa, 2003: 4.
（8） Ohsawa, 2003: 5.
（9） Jung, 1959: 7.
（10） Jung, 1959: 8.
（11） Jung, 1959: 8-9.
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（23） Caron, 2003: sole p.
（24） Caron, 2003: sole p.
（25） Despite the fact that Japan considers itself a secular society, burakumin are ethnic 
Japanese that continue to be discriminated because, historically, their forefathers 
dedicated themselves to trades that Buddhism considered impure, i.e. butchers, 
leather-tanners, gravediggers, etc. The Ainu (native inhabitants to Northern 
Honshuu and Hokkaidou) and the Ryuu-kyuu ( 琉球 ) islanders (native inhabitants 
to Okinawa) are also other Japanese minorities that are discriminated by the ethnic 
Japanese majority, and conveniently overlooked by nihonjinron studies when they 
claim Japanese have an unique ancestry.
（26） Caron, 2003: sole p.
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147
 “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?”
（31） Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979: 54-55.
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